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OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: AIR POWER IN KOSOVO. A CASE STUDY IN COERCIVE VICTORY

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ABSTRACT

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With the inception of airpower and the development of its warfighting capabilities, airpower theorists and airman have postulated that airpower could achieve strategic goals unilaterally. Does Operation Allied Force, the Air War over Kosovo, validate this thesis? Or does it offer further historical evidence of the invalidity of the proposition? Using Robert Pape's Coercive Model, Bombing to Win, this study analyzes Operation Allied Force to test the validity of the coercive theory. Future strategic leaders may find the conclusions of this study useful in planning campaigns.

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ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT IN KOSOVO.

At the close of the twentieth century, at the center of the world's stage was the region of the European continent known as the Balkans, specifically the province of Kosovo in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Since the death of Josef Tito in 1980, marking the beginning of the disintegration of the Yugoslavian state, a cornerstone of the appeals of the Serbian nationalists and ultra-nationalists has been inclusion of Kosovo in Serbia.[1] Kosovo is viewed by the Serbians as the cradle of their nation, dating back to June 1389 and the Battle of Kosovo Polje. While Serbians claim a historical right to Kosovo, Kosovar Albanians presently occupy a major portion of the province and also claim it as their ancestral home. The Kosovar Albanians are seeking independent status for an Albanian Kosovo.

Within this dynamic setting and fueled by the volatile Serbian leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, internal conflict erupted into a civil war between the Serbian and Albanian populations in 1997. Reports of human rights violations, ethnic cleansing, and the ousting of hundreds of thousands of Albanians from their homes and from key economic areas brought Kosovo, dubiously, to the forefront of the international scene.

The International community monitored the on-going violence and viewed with concern the growing instability in the region. UN Resolutions 1160 and 1199, adopted by the Security Council in March and September 1998, respectively, proclaimed an international mandate to end hostilities and maintain a ceasefire. While diplomatic efforts continued to seek a peaceful settlement to the crisis and to secure full compliance with the UN resolutions, NATO, through the North Atlantic Council (NAC), authorized an activation order allowing for both "limited air strikes" and a "phased air campaign" in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the likely event Yugoslav authorities refused to comply with the UN resolutions.[2]

Diplomatic posturing continued into October 1998. An agreement ensued when it was thought Milosevic had complied sufficiently with international demands. With this understanding air strikes were deemed unwarranted. Given Milosevic's compliance, NATO suspended the order to authorize air strikes, but did not fully lift the order. Following this suspension, the October agreement began to unravel. The Albanians' Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) perceived NATO as their ally and subsequently intensified their own military efforts. Responding in kind, the Serbian Military Campaign geared up to defeat the KLA in the field. The October agreement was dead, and the civil war was very much alive.

Following repeated NATO warnings in early 1999 to use military force, accompanied by British and French insistence that they were ready to send in ground forces to enforce a peace settlement,[3] the Rambouillet Peace Conference was initiated in France in February 1999. Rambouillet proved to be the last opportunity for Milosevic to agree to a peaceful settlement to the Kosovo Crisis. While the Albanians ultimately did sign the Rambouillet Peace Agreement, Slobodan Milosevic would not. Milosevic believed the final outcome of the Peace Agreement would inevitably sever Kosovo from Serbia, an outcome unacceptable to the Serbians. U.S. President Clinton dispatched a special envoy to Belgrade in one final effort to get the Serbian leader to sign the accords. Slobodan Milosevic knew that if he did not agree to the Rambouillet Accord then the bombing would begin. There was no misunderstanding; diplomatic coercion finally proved ineffective. The bombing started 24 March 1999.[4]

Operation Allied Force, the Air War over Serbia and Kosovo, lasted 78 days. During this bombardment, more than 37,000 sorties were flown by thirteen NATO countries, including 14,000 strike sorties.[5] Approximately 23,000 bombs and missiles were dropped and launched, 35 percent of them precision guided.[6] On 9 June 1999, NATO and the Yugoslavian military authorities signed an agreement calling for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo. The following day, NATO suspended air strikes. Conflict in this part of the Balkans, for the time being, was over.

Without committing NATO ground forces, an air war was initiated, executed, and terminated-heralded by the participating international community as a historic success. How did Operation Allied Force, a unilateral air campaign, achieve such a resounding air victory? Or did it? Review of applicable airpower theories supports the following case study analysis of Operation Allied Force.

MILITARY COERCION AND AIRPOWER THEORIES.

To establish the basis for the case study on Operation Allied Force, reviews of military coercion theory and other applicable airpower theories of punishment, denial, and decapitation are in order. Robert Pape presents these theories in Bombing to Win.

MILITARY COERCION.

Military coercion refers to the use of military force or the threat of force utilization, to change the behavior of an offending state or statesman. As the civil war in Kosovo heated up, international contact groups were established to enhance diplomatic negotiations with the warring factions. They sought to coerce the perceived perpetrator of the conflict, Slobodan

Milosevic, to cease and desist his bellicosity. These diplomatic efforts continued up to the start of the air war. Last-ditch efforts through special envoys were attempted. But finally only the use of force coerced Milosevic to stop the fighting. The use of force has the greatest physical consequences.[7] Unfortunately many diplomats and politicians perceive military coercion as the quickest and cheapest solution to an otherwise difficult international problem. To many, air power offers the most economical method to execute a perceived cheap solution. Air power also offers a rather antiseptic, seemingly detached manner of coercion. Without ground warfare, air power appears to be much cleaner and less threatening, unless you are in the airplane or receiving the bombing. Theorists promise decisive effects from matching the coercer's strategy to the targeted state's vulnerabilities. This matching establishes the linkage between target sets and desired results. So theories of airpower delineate the effects destruction of selected target sets have on altering the adversary's behavior. Thus the theorists determine the most efficient ways to use air power to achieve specific strategic goals.

PUNISHMENT THEORY OF AIR POWER APPLICATION.

Pape asserts that coercion by punishment is a distinct form of warfighting. Coercion through punishment, in the case of airpower, seeks to inflict sufficient pain on the enemy civilians to overwhelm their interests in the conflict. Given enough punishment, the theory holds that either the government will concede or the population will revolt.[8] But punishment strategies in practice do not offer significant leverage for coercion. Historically, they have failed. The Japanese bombing Pearl Harbor and the German bombing of British cities during the Second World War, while wreaking short-term destruction, did more to harden the attitudes of the Americans and British against their foes than it did to cause them to capitulate. The bulk of Operation Allied Force was not intended as punishment, but the initial bombing sought to punish Milosevic and the Serbs into submission. Consistent with history, the punishment strategy failed in Allied Force for the following reasons:

First, both sides were passionately committed to a nationalistic cause. The Serbians could not accept the existence of an independent Kosovo, while the Albanians were fighting for that independence. As a result, both sides were willing to accept high costs, including civilian suffering, to achieve their objectives.

Second, coercion by punishment in the form of bombing often occurs during a time of conflict, not in isolation from a larger conflict. At this time both parties-Serbians and Kosovar Albanians-had become accustomed to suffering. Long-standing conflict in the Balkans served to immunize the people to violence and death. They were used to a savage civil war. Pape

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concludes, "As a result, the longer a society is at war, the greater are the costs it will bear and less inclined it is to accept settlements, even ones that would have been acceptable in peacetime."[9] From the Serbian perspective, the war for Kosovo had been going on since 1389.

Further, the punishment strategy in this case failed because the damage resulting from conventional munitions inflicts only limited damage on a civilian populace. As the 21st century warfighter is keenly aware, civilian targets are not on the approved target list. Planners and warfighters take great pains to limit collateral damage and prevent innocent civilian deaths and suffering. In fact, one of the justifications for Operation Allied Force was that it was a humanitarian war,[10] a war fought to stop killing. Utilizing an inhumane punishment strategy in a humanitarian war is nothing short of a bizarre paradox. Therefore, if you do not target civilians, the conventional weapons used have even less of an effect on the populace, thereby weakening the punishment strategy. Consider how the accidental bomb that hit the Chinese Embassy on 7 May 2000 affected the conduct of the air campaign. Current warfighting capabilities include precision strikes, raising international public expectations of a bloodless, errorless campaign. Any incident such as this accidental bombing is perceived as a failure or, worse, as a directed diplomatic signal. Surely such an accident arouses tremendous publicity and seemingly endless journalistic analysis. The international uproar that ensued after this incident further illustrated the lack of tolerance for this type of warfare, or its errors, in the 21st century.

Finally, the supposed chain of civilian hardship caused by punishment bombing, producing public anger that causes the people to revolt against the government, lacks historical precedents. In fact, the opposite effect has been exhibited: Nationalistic fervor is reinforced by punishment bombing, giving even despots greater public support. Consider the reason this civil war began, nationalistic fervor! Such passion does not need to be reinforced by bombing!

The punishment theory of coercion laid the groundwork for transition to the denial theory of coercion, as the true theoretical basis for Operation Allied Force. Operation Allied Force was eventually conducted in accordance with the denial theory of air power application.

DENIAL THEORY OF AIR POWER APPLICATION.

According to Pape, the denial theory of air power application holds that bombing selected targets frustrates an adversary form achieving his objectives and eventually persuades him of the futility of continuing the fight. "Denial strategies target the opponent's military ability to achieve its territorial or political objectives, thereby compelling concessions in order to avoid futile expenditure of further resources."[11] A pure denial strategy does not attempt to impose suffering on the opponent's society. The lines separating punishment and denial are not very

clear here, but denial does not warrant indiscriminately targeting urban centers. Denial strategies focus on frustrating the military strategy of the opponent.

Air power advocates cite two types of coercive air operations: strategic bombing and interdiction. Strategic bombing focuses on attacks on the enemy's strategic center of gravity, including such strategic targets as fixed military and industrial sites. On the other hand, interdiction campaigns focus on severing the military force from its base, including attacking lines of supply, theater logistical centers, command centers, and fielded forces. "Theater air campaigns are virtually pure denial. They seek to weaken enemy battlefield forces by starving them of needed logistical support or by direct attrition so that their collapse becomes inevitable."[12]

Pape cites three limitations of the denial theory: First, the coercer can obtain concessions only after specific territory has been denied the opponent. Second, the military pressure must be maintained continuously until a settlement is reached. Finally, it is an expensive strategy, since the coercer must control the territory by force.[13]

In retrospect, the effectiveness of Operation Allied Force is best explained in light of two related theories of coercion: the denial theory and the decapitation theory. First used in the Gulf War of 1991, the decapitation theory of military coercion was thought to be the more appropriate and more efficient theory for Kosovo, especially by the American airmen running and fighting the war. Although those warriors might not have designated it as the decapitation theory, the actions they requested and the post-conflict analyses exhibit their desire to "Go for the head of the snake first."[14]

THE DECAPITATION THEORY OF AIR POWER APPLICATION.

With its roots in the execution of the Gulf War, the Decapitation Theory of Air Power seeks to achieve both punishment and denial effects by destroying a selected group of crucial targets. From an airmen's perspective, the decapitation strategy represents the schoolbook solution in air power employment. This strategy utilizes all the elements of a modern air force to achieve the military objectives in the most rapid and efficient manner. Utilizing advanced data links and precision-guided munitions, well-timed attacks can cause destruction, disorder, and panic to the point of forcing the enemy to capitulate quickly. This is the effect the Air Chief for Operation Allied Force sought to bring, a rapid and decisive end to the hostilities in Kosovo. Realistically, the ability to conduct an unfettered air campaign may exist only in the classroom via computer simulation. With the political constraints that characterize the conduct of alliance warfare today, all participants operate within various constraints. To the dismay of some

warfighters, the air operation is just a subset of the political, diplomatic, and military effort, all designed to achieve an international solution to a given crisis. From the key air power advisor to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe comes this sobering dose of reality: "The military must respond to political decisions. There is no point, really, for airpower exponents grumbling about escalation or gradualism. If we are going to maximize airpower responsiveness, we will have to turn it on and turn it off. The important thing is to make sure we reach the necessary impact before we turn it off and establish hard-nosed rules for the gaps."[15]

THE MISSION AND CAMPAIGN PLAN OF OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.

THE MISSION OF OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.

Several different lists of goals were issued during the campaign, creating confusion on the exact objectives of the operation. A North Atlantic Council statement listed five goals. The President of the United States stated there were three goals for the operation. The United States Secretary of Defense, addressing the Senate Armed Services Committee on 15 April 1999, cited two: "Our military objective is to degrade and damage the military and security structure that President Milosevic has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo."[16] The homepage for Operation Allied Force specifies the following objectives:

1. A verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo;
2. Withdrawal from Kosovo of Serbian military, police and para-military forces;
3. Agreement to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
4. Agreement to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, an unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations; and
5. Credible assurance of Serbian willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.[17]

For the remainder of this study, the analysis will focus on these goals from the Operation Allied Force homepage. These goals represent an all-encompassing set of objectives for the operation.

THE CAMPAIGN PLAN OF OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.

The method to achieve the military objectives in Kosovo was Operation Plan (OPLAN) 10601 – "Allied Force." At least a year in the planning phase, OPLAN 10601 specified five

phases of execution. The concept of operations contained in 10601 envisioned targeting based on gradual, situationally adjusted application of NATO air forces, depending upon political and military developments.[18] Phase Zero was commenced on 20 January 1999 as a political signal. This phase was carried out when the air forces moved into their operational airfields for the follow-on execution phase. During this phase practice flight operations were conducted. The Execution Phases of 10601 are characterized as follows:

* Phase One, beginning on 24 March 1999, was labeled "Limited Air Response." Limited air operations were conducted, using only precision standoff weapons, with strikes against militarily significant targets and the integrated air-defense system (IADS) throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This phase lasted for three days, until 27 March 1999. Phase One showed NATO resolve in the hope of securing an early victory. This phase did not represent the way the United States would employ air power by massively striking at strategic targets that supported Milosevic. Rather, Phase One represented the gradualism endorsed by coalition consensus.

* Phase Two, authorized 27 March 1999 by unanimous resolution of the NATO allies, extended attacks to the security forces' military infrastructure in Kosovo and reinforcement headquarters (e.g. headquarters, telecommunication installations, material and ammunition depots, systems for production and storage of fuel, barracks).

* Phase Three, never authorized, expanded air operations north of the 44th parallel for targets of military significance.

* Phases Four and Five called for air support of stabilization and redeployment operations, which were post conflict operations. These phases were to be initiated following achievement of the military objectives; they support implementation of concessions achieved by means of Phase Three. Since they support post-conflict operations, they are not subject to this analysis of Operation Allied Force.[19]

THE COERCIVE STRATEGIES OF OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.

Analysis of the three executed phases of Operation Allied Force: Phases Zero, One and Two, and their associated target sets reveals the underlying coercive strategies employed. While Phase One lasted only three days, the target set selected and the execution conforms to the punishment strategy of coercion. This three-day bombardment was designed to coerce Milosevic to surrender as a result of its psychological impact. Perhaps some NATO leaders believed that the bombing in August and September of 1995 in Bosnia, which brought about the Dayton Peace Accords, could yield a similar result in 1999. This was not to be the case. By

proceeding with Phase One, NATO ceded the initiative to Milosevic. He would now determine when (and if) he had been punished enough. Unless Milosevic surrendered or the Serbians launched a campaign of ethnic separation, how would NATO determine whether any of the objectives for this phase had been met? The Bosnian example could have given the alliance another insight. Coercion by punishment hardens a society against its effects, rendering it less inclined to accept settlements or to capitulate after three days of bombing. Phase One has been characterized as going after "too few targets with too few aircraft for almost too long a period."[20] Two overarching mistakes of Phase One can be summed up as follows: first, opening an air campaign merely as a demonstration is not a good idea. Second, NATO underestimated the amount of airpower necessary to support its diplomatic goals.[21]

Unanimously the NATO allies agreed to transition to Phase Two, thereby shifting to the denial strategy of airpower application. It is often very difficult to separate routine tactical warfighting and denial in theater air operations, because there may be few or no observable differences. The difference is not so much in the design of the operation as in the extent of its prosecution.[22] A month into the operation, it became apparent to NATO that the contained nature of Phase Two was not effective. In April 1999 at the NATO summit, the military leaders of Operation Allied Force were given greater latitude to attack strategic and tactical targets elsewhere in Yugoslavia and Kosovo. This new flexibility had to be exercised within the existing authority of Phase One and Phase Two. NATO deemed it was necessary to sustain the pressure on both the strategic level and the tactical level.[23] At this point in Phase Two, theory met real-world application. One of the requirements for success of the denial theory in the application of air power is the need for continued pressure to achieve coercion. Phase Two as it was being executed in April 1999 was not getting the mission accomplished; it was not keeping the pressure on. Consider this observation of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC): "10 or 12 days into the war, ...they were holding rock concerts in downtown Belgrade because we had not yet been able to go after that target set."[24] An expansion of the available targets was forthcoming.

Operation Allied Force has been characterized not as an air campaign, despite the claims of air power enthusiasts, but as a major combined offensive air operation. [25] While this characterization seems to be a matter of semantics, it does have merit. A campaign is defined as a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.[26] NATO forces did not plan or execute a series of major operations. Rather, they conducted a three-day event, Phase One, then moved into the rest of the operation, Phase Two. This transition represents a rather liberal interpretation and

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application of the term campaign, designated Allied Force. Allied Force is best designated as an operation, rather than as a campaign.

With the expansion of the target set in Phase Two, a more effective method of execution was beginning to be utilized to achieve the desired ends. Also, the means to accomplish the desired ends, the number of aircraft, was being increased. By the time the operation entered the month of June, more than double the number of aircraft were committed to the operation than at its outset in March. Although the target set was expanded, the alliance's approval process for target selection remained cumbersome and inefficient. Some targets were not hit due to anxiety within some of NATO's 19 governments, fearing the possibility of accidental civilian casualties and the erosion of public support. Other targets were not hit for cultural and nationalistic reasons. A theme that quickly emerged in Phase One came to dominate the entire operation: "We must not to destroy the whole country."[27]

The first two months of Operation Allied Force were marked by unfavorable weather. No matter which theory of air power applies or which strategy is employed, weather still affects aviation. Coupled with the limitations imposed through the alliance, Allied Force got off to a slow start. By mid-May, with better weather and the expanded target set, Milosevic began to feel the pressure on the strategic and tactical levels. The Serbian 3rd Army in the field, which many believed Milosevic had written off, was taking a pounding. As the 3rd Army modified its tactics in order to survive, the NATO aviators responded and kept the pressure on. Noting the effects of these continued attacks, Milosevic began to realize the damage to his entire military structure, not just the forces in the field in Kosovo, but throughout the entire country.[28] The pounding the Serbian forces took during the last week of the operation demonstrated NATO resolve and proved to the Serbians and Milosevic that there was no way out: This situation was only going to get steadily worse. Meeting on 3 June 1999 with envoys from Russia and the European Union, Slobodan Milosevic finally accepted the terms for peace. NATO resolve through Operation Allied Force had produced the desired political result in Kosovo. With the authorization of the United Nations on 10 June 1999, NATO forces deployed into a pacified Kosovo.[29]

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE SUCCESS OF ALLIED FORCE.

Given the international legitimacy established by UN resolutions and the power of the NATO air armada, Operation Allied Force has been proclaimed a historical success. From the Secretary of Defense of the United States, the country that supplied the bulk of the air forces to the coalition, comes the statement that the U.S. and NATO achieved all the goals set when the operation began in March: "We did in fact stop the killing; we did in fact force Milosevic's Forces

out of Kosovo; we did in fact have a return of the refugees; we did in fact have a peacekeeping force led by NATO; and we do in fact have a situation now where there is progress being made for the autonomous governments on the part of the Kosovar's."[30] While this proclamation of success seems widely accepted, there is debate in some quarters whether Operation Allied Force represents a turning point in history, a decisive case-in-point in the debate between land force doctrine and aerospace doctrine. "For the first time in some 5,000 years of Military history -5,000 years of history of man taking organized forces into combat - we saw an independent air operation produce a political result. What that means for the future we still have to divine. ... This kind of utility can do nothing but place greater demands on air and space forces for the future."[31]

While no NATO ground force was introduced during the execution of Allied Force, some point out that the Kosovo Liberation Army served as a surrogate army for NATO. The KLA was the engaged ground force necessary to draw the Serbian forces out of hiding, enabling the NATO air force to find and destroy them. Without this ground combat, air forces are less effective and unable to achieve a unilateral solution to any conflict, some would argue. When the KLA was engaged with the Serbian forces, they primarily used guerrilla tactics. A major offensive by the KLA, code-named 'Arrow', was launched 26 May and proved unsuccessful. In fact, after-action assessments show no correlation between any KLA activity and vehicles destroyed by NATO aircraft.[32] There is no substantial evidence of coordination between the aircraft executing Operation Allied Force and the KLA. Through recent technological advancements, rapid intelligence, and knowledge of the dynamic battlefield it is possible for airmen to find and hit targets without army forces in place.

Another possible limitation of air power in this operation is the contention that air attacks on the fielded forces ultimately were of no importance to the outcome of the war. If air power had not weakened on the 3rd Army, would Milosevic have capitulated with his army still intact and free to maneuver around Kosovo and wreak havoc? The Yugoslavian Army did in fact suffer significant attrition. While the numbers are still being debated and the percentage of attrition is in question, the forces, when not being bombed, were hunkered down and not in positions to mass for maneuver. Thus this army was neutralized, if not totally destroyed. The Kosovo Strike Assessment, produced under the auspices of an army general, provides the most complete and careful review of strike data in the history of air warfare.[33] The assessment confirmed three things concerning aerospace power: First, air power is effective against mobile targets, even when dispersed. The challenge lies in the finding the target in the first place and maintaining coverage of the battlespace to spot and attack forces that try to maneuver. Second,

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surveillance has become mature enough so that it is now possible to maintain a highly accurate tally of what is being located and hit. Finally, the air operation or campaign should balance fixed strategic targets and mobile targets.[34] Once Phase Two was expanded to attack those strategic and tactical targets, the outcome was certain.

Many strategic analysts remain surprised that the air operation brought the Serbians back to the bargaining table. Prior to Operation Allied Force, many commentators and military analysts were ready to explain that air power alone would not be successful. Long noted for his doubts about air power, John Keegan, famed British military historian, admitted that he had been wrong. Keegan acknowledged that the third of June in 1999 was a real "turning point" in history, "when the capitulation of President Milosevic proved that a war can be won by airpower alone."[35]

COERCIVE VICTORY: PUNISHMENT AND DENIAL THEORY APPLIED.

The United States and NATO wanted to compel Slobodan Milosevic to stop military violence and end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The failure of the Punishment Theory in the application of air power to coercing Slobodan Milosevic to surrender to international demands during Phase One of Operation Allied Force was predictable. Punishment strategies to resolve long-standing civil conflicts over ethnic and nationalistic issues do not offer significant leverage for coercion. Historically, punishment strategies fail time after time. Operation Allied Force can now be added to this long list of failures.

Operation Allied Force eventually succeeded. Its success is best explained by the denial theory of air power coercion. As Phase Two was expanded with sufficient air power, the allies were able to enforce the diplomacy desired by the international community. Confronted with these aviation assets and the expanded strategic and tactical target sets, Slobodan Milosevic was convinced that further resistance was futile. He was frustrated from achieving his military objectives. Further, he was compelled to accept concessions in order to avoid further destruction of his forces and his country.

This case study of Operation Allied Force validates Pape's theory of military coercion by application of air power, reinforcing the ineffectiveness of the punishment strategy and demonstrating the positive potential of the denial strategy. Operation Allied Force, for the first time in history, even with the inherent limitations of alliance warfare, proved that air power alone can produce a political result. The future of warfare may not have been drastically altered, but the level of expectation for the execution of the next air campaign has been. With precise

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bombing, limited collateral damage and no loss of life, the next air campaign will be judged against the standard set by Operation Allied Force. We know that a formidable and recalcitrant adversary can be denied his military objectives and coerced to an undesirable agreement to cease hostilities by sole means of skillfully and persistently applied air power.

WORD COUNT = 4889.

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